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INFLUENCING LEGISLATION FOR JUVENILES IN THE ADULT JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF LEGAL ADVOCATES  
Krista Franklin 
Antioch University Seattle 
Seattle, WA 
 
This phenomenological study explores the lived experience of Washington State lawmakers and 
legal activists regarding their involvement in passing Washington State Senate Bill 5064 in 
February 2014. In response to the 2012 landmark federal Supreme Court decision, Miller v. 
Alabama, Senate Bill 5064 reduced the number of crimes for which juveniles could be sentenced 
as adults to life without parole. Six interviewees were selected from those who testified in 
Olympia, WA. Individual interviews were conducted in an open-ended style. Participants were 
asked questions about their motivation for getting involved in this bill, and asked to describe 
their experience. The purpose of the study is to inform those in the fields of psychology and law 
in order to advocate and support young offenders who are being underserved by the court 
system. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and Ohio 
Link ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/etd. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
On February 12, 2014, Senate Bill 5064, entitled “An Act Relating to Persons Sentenced 
for Offenses Committed Prior to Reaching Eighteen Years of Age” passed in Washington State. 
Its legislative purpose was to ensure compliance to the Federal Court ruling in Miller vs. 
Alabama of 2012, in which the court used the principles outlined in the Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment regarding cruel and unusual punishment. The majority of Supreme Court Justices 
held that its protection prohibits “a sentencing scheme” that allows for permanent imprisonment 
with no possibility for release for young offenders (age 18 or less) convicted of murder (SB 
5064, 2014, p. 2). Furthermore, compliance to the ruling would require that sentencing judges 
consider factors including the age of the defendant when the crime was committed. The topic of 
this dissertation focuses on the scholarly and legal advocacy work of those who have participated 
in the key developments that led to the mandated changes in sentencing that restrict the state’s 
power to sentence juveniles to imprisonment for life.  
On this issue, I have been influenced by the generation of ideas brought forth by a variety 
of psychologists, but community psychologist, Isaac Prilleltensky, stands out as an inspirational 
transformational leader. In an article published in 2008, he offered a description of the 
relationship between power, oppression, and the role of the psychologist: “The exercise of power 
is based on the juxtaposition of wishing, consciously or unconsciously, to change something and 
the opportunity, afforded by social and historical circumstances, to do so” (Prilleltensky, 2008, p. 
119). The urgency to explore the matters pertaining to juvenile sentencing practices is founded in 
the understanding that the American criminal justice system has historically disproportionately 
penalized marginalized populations. According to author and public defense lawyer, Bryan 





years we have been the only country in the world that sentences children to life imprisonment 
without parole” (p. 15). This kind of discrimination warrants as much research and investigation 
those in the field of psychology can give it. 
The discussion offered in this dissertation will add a new dimension to the existing body 
of research pertaining to the social and psychological experiences forged in and by the juvenile 
criminal justice system. In focusing on the history of the development of the juvenile justice 
system, I hope to highlight the influences and confluences of many academic fields (particularly 
law and psychology), and to contribute to the formation of a process that is continually changing 
as new academic and political information is brought to light. More significantly, however, by 
incorporating data collected from interviews with activists who have recently advocated for 
Washington State’s adaptation of 2012’s federal law, this dissertation intends to contextualize and 
explicate the beliefs that motivated a group of six to eight individuals to participate in policy 
creation that significantly altered the lives of juveniles who once qualified for incarceration 
without the possibility of release. 
The primary research question asked of the participants during their interviews addressed 
the following: What was the essence of this shared experience? What was the experience like, 
and what meaning did it have for those involved, both prior to, and following the Senate Bill’s 
passage? This type of curiosity and approach to research is referred to as phenomenological 
research, and is one of four primary methods of qualitative psychological research (Creswell, 
2014).  
This study was designed to highlight the shared experiences of those who supported 
juvenile offenders in policy that affects sentencing and, more importantly, to support and 





particularly as regards this vulnerable population. In learning more about the treatment that 
young offenders have historically faced, and the kinds of actions undertaken on their behalf, 
psychologists and other scholars might be more inclined to advocate for them, and further realize 
the possibilities for practitioners to take up new roles in the public sphere. For example, readers 
will learn that testifying on behalf of juveniles during the proposal of new bills is open to the 
public and, moreover, present an opportunity to directly shape policies in accordance with 
psychological theories and practices. Information to be shared by psychologists in these settings 
includes updated brain developmental science that suggests the differences between children and 
adults, and the amenability of the younger brain to rehabilitation.  
While this dissertation seeks primarily to inform psychologists and their practice, this is 
an interdisciplinary field of study and needs to be recognized as such. The following review of 
the literature incorporates the work of many important academic fields, including pertinent 
trajectories and discoveries in law, psychology, sociology, politics, history, and philosophy on the 
subject of juvenile criminality and sentencing. In particular, I discuss the history of juvenile 
criminality in the United States and trace the development of adult–child distinctions in the 
American scholarly community and justice system. The dissertation will then cover key federal 
case outcomes that pertained to juvenile cases. Some of them involve young offenders while 
others involve sentencing decisions for adult defendants. These are all considered precedent-
setting legal standards that apply to juvenile legal matters due to issues that relate to case 
outcomes regardless of age. These would include topics Supreme Court justices ultimately 
decided were germane to culpability and fairness, such as cognitive impairment and racial bias. 
Federal cases are discussed here because they mandate laws that states must adopt, as in the case 





who are accused of crimes committed under the age of 18. At times, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in these selected cases overtly reflect the contributions of policy developers of the day, 
and, as will be seen, at times its decisions derive from judicial opinions that stood outside 
political tides. 
List of Terms 
The following definitions have been taken verbatim from Black’s Law Dictionary 
(Garner, 2006) and will be used in this study: 
Appeal: A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority; esp., the 
submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher court for review and possible 
reversal. (p. 39) 
 
Common law: The body of law based on the English legal system, as distinct from a civil-law 
system. (p. 118) 
 
Corporal punishment: Physical punishment; punishment that is inflicted on the body (including 
imprisonment). (p. 582) 
 
Court-martial: An ad hoc military court convened under military authority to try someone, 
particularly a member of the armed forces, accused of violating the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. (p. 160) 
 
Criminal capacity: The mental ability that a person must possess to be held accountable for a 
crime; the ability to understand right from wrong. (p. 86) 
 
Culpable: Guilty, blameworthy. (p. 170) 
 
Defendant: A person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding. (p. 190) 
 
Detention: The act or fact of holding a person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay – 
detain. (p. 205) 
 
Diminished capacity: An impaired mental condition—short of insanity—that is caused by 
intoxication, trauma or disease that prevents a person from having the mental state necessary to 
be held responsible for a crime. (p. 86) 
 
Due process: The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for 
the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing 






Juvenile: A person who has not yet reached the age of 18, at which one should be treated as an 
adult by the criminal justice system. (p. 401) 
 
Juvenile delinquent: A minor who is guilty of criminal behavior, usually punishable by special 
laws not pertaining to adults. (p. 401) 
 
Mandatory sentence: A sentence set by law with no discretion for the judge to individualize 
punishment. (p. 645) 
 
Mitigating circumstance: A fact or situation that does not bear on the question of a defendant’s 
guilt but that is considered by the court in imposing punishment and esp. in lessening the severity 
of the sentence. (p. 102)  
 
Parens patriae: The state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for 
themselves. (p. 520) 
 
Rehabilitation: The process of seeking to improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that he 
or she can function in a society without committing other crimes. (p. 604) 
 
Status offender: A youth who engages in conduct that—though not criminal by adult 
standards—is considered inappropriate enough to bring a charge against the youth in criminal 
court; a juvenile who commits a status offense. (p. 504) 
 
Waiver: The voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or 






CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Childhood—A Protected Status 
English Common Law 
 In England, treatment of criminals remained relatively consistent from the 5th century 
until the Middle Ages under English common law (Binder et al., 2001). Common law was the 
body of policies that governed the criminal justice system in England since the 17th century and 
served as precedent for the American judicial system (Merriam Webster, 201). Under English 
common law, adults and juveniles were subject to similar punishments, generally inflicting 
physical pain on the offender (Binder et al., 2001). Imprisonment was rarely imposed on children 
and adolescents. Young offenders underwent the same court proceedings as adults, though they 
were periodically given merciful consideration in sentencing and punishment. English common 
law served as policy for the earliest settlers of what would become the United States. 
Puritanism and Child Development 
 The American colonists approached child rearing through a puritanical framework 
(Binder et al., 2001). Puritanism is defined as “strictness and austerity especially in matters of 
religion or conduct” (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Their belief system viewed the family and home 
life as the center of moral development which created the conditions for a moral society (Binder 
et al., 2001). Children were considered impressionable when it came to experiences in early life, 
and caretakers were held accountable for the treatment of them as such. The colonists believed in 
discipline but differentiated children from adults due to the perception of their malleability in 
character. Early life was regarded as an opportune time to shape children to conform to ideals of 
Puritanism which they believed ultimately paved the way to a good afterlife. They believed that a 





factors precluded children from the ability to form the intent necessary to be charged and 
punished as adults. This idea formed the basis for the protective and nurturing treatment of child 
offenders and influenced policy makers in subsequent centuries.  
Parens Patriae 
 Accordingly, reformers from this time operated under a belief that the government should 
fulfill its obligation to poor children who were not protected by their family systems. The idea of 
the government and community leaders stepping in to assist vulnerable children appears to have 
originated from a medieval legal precedent entitled parens patriae, which “was an assertion of 
the right of the state to assume the wardship of a child when the natural parents or testamentary 
guardians were adjudged unfit to perform their duties” (Binder et al., 2001, p. 204). British 
colonists, and the American legal system they helped create, continued to follow common law’s 
tenets when considering legal actions involving children (Binder et al., 2001). For example, in 
the nation’s early years, the state assumed the authority to take children out of their homes 
without engaging in official legal proceedings. A more detailed version of the parens patriae 
doctrine developed during the 19th century. This period’s policy creators believed that an 
effective way to deal with the problems involving children and crime in urban settings was to 
separate juvenile delinquents from their families and neighborhoods, and place them in homes 
intended to serve a rehabilitative purpose.  
The houses of refuge. The first attempt at accomplishing rehabilitation via a home for 
juvenile offenders came with the creation of the “houses of refuge” in New York in 1825 
(Abbott, 1938). Its inception resulted from an approach to the problem of young offenders 
proposed by an organization known as the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents. 





rehabilitation. Other large cities on the East coast soon followed New York’s example; within a 
few years, Philadelphia and Boston had opened juvenile rehabilitation homes of their own.  
The first case to challenge the state’s assumption of parens patriae involved a house of 
refuge in Philadelphia (Shepard, 1999). In the case of Ex Parte Crouse (1838), Mary Ann 
Crouse’s mother had committed her to a house of refuge for being “an incorrigible child.” Her 
father challenged the detainment, asserting that the younger Crouse had been held without 
affording her the opportunity of due process. The court upheld the detainment of Crouse on the 
grounds that she would fare better if she was institutionalized. It justified its decision as acting as 
a protector of the child as well as the public (Binder et al., 2001) 
This decision signified an important shift leading to changes in the sentencing of 
convicted criminals based on age (Shepard, 1999). The enforcement of equal punishment and 
sentencing for adults and juveniles was re-examined as the criminal justice system began to more 
deliberately separate these two groups and consider young offenders’ individual capacity to 
commit crimes and the chance for rehabilitation as compared to adults. During that time, 
increasing numbers of children and adults were incarcerated. As opposed to the previously 
customary corporal (physical) punishment, children found themselves mixed in with adult 
prisoners, although not forced into physical labor as the adults were. Reformers were concerned 
that children and teenagers were being housed with adults who would not only exhibit deviant 
behavior, but teach it as well. 
Houses of refuge scheduled activities in order to induce residents to perform functions of 
facility maintenance as well as rehabilitation (Binder et al., 2001). The detainees lived within a 
system of earned privileges, with a variety of food and access to the outside world held as prizes 





dormitories. These dwellings not only housed those convicted of crimes, but also those who were 
perceived as budding offenders. This model of juvenile detention was used for the creation of 
other residential institutions such as “reform schools” and “cottage systems.” Their 
administrators devised programs to both separate offenders from their neighborhoods and teach 
them the social and trade skills needed to assimilate into society. This approach exemplified the 
belief of the time that juveniles could be effectively rehabilitated. 
Adolescence Recognized by the Field of Psychology 
 Toward the end of the 19th century, the field of psychology gathered increasing authority 
and respect as a science in Europe and America. One of the figures credited with contributing to 
its recognition as an academic field was psychologist G. Stanley Hall, who was known 
historically as an investigator of the effects of evolutionary development and the brain.  Among 
the first to create research labs devoted to the study of psychology, in 1817, Hall also founded 
the first journal dedicated to psychological research and study in the United States–the American 
Journal of Psychology–and became the first leader of the American Psychological Association 
(Goodwin, 2012). Hall’s theories defined adolescence as a period in human development distinct 
from both childhood and adulthood, an idea that echoed those of that era’s reformers. His book, 
Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, 
Crime, Religion and Education (1904), was therefore adopted by policy makers, lending 
credibility to the contention that juveniles as a group were to be protected as a vulnerable 
population. In this text, Hall elaborated on this period of life as one of emotional upheaval and 
advocated for particular education and consideration for this stage of development. He 
maintained that the teenage years were critical ones during which individuals were influenced by 





contribution to the burgeoning field of psychology upheld the then popular belief that the 
character of adolescents was different than the adult, particularly in the sense that it was more 
influenced by stress and amenable to molding. 
The First Juvenile Court 
 In the Chicago area, the above-mentioned studies helped legitimize the call for a more 
formalized system for processing juvenile cases (Shepard, 1999). Concurrent with this 
movement investigating the effects of urbanization on young offenders was a court case that 
challenged the assumed powers of parens patriae: the 1870 case of People ex rel. O’Connell v. 
Turner. In this case, the court ruled the detainment of Daniel O’Connell was unlawful on the 
grounds that he merely had the potential to commit a crime without having actually committed 
any (People v. Turner, 1870). Further, the Chicago reformers proposed a senate bill entitled the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 that outlined a plan providing “a separate court and probation 
staff” for juveniles and “forbade” the integration of adult and juvenile inmates (Binder et al., 
2001, p. 215).  Despite the outcome of the O’Connell case, the proposed legislation was intended 
to invest the new court system with authority over cases involving children who appeared at risk 
for criminal activity as well as those actually accused of it. The bill passed, thus establishing the 
first juvenile court of the United States.   
The new court system was distinct in several important ways. First of all, it did not grant 
the same rights to accused juveniles as those granted to accused adults. Defendants were tried in 
front of a judge with no jury present. Other participants involved in hearings included “parents 
and the probation officer who served as an expert on the subject” (Binder et al., 2001, p. 215). 
Decisions to detain juveniles were not founded on demonstrated culpability; rather they were tied 





was frequently ordered instead of incarceration, with defendants generally sent home under the 
supervision of a probation officer. These officers played major roles in the lives of delinquents, 
serving as both monitors and interventionists on the home front as well as key experts in court 
procedures. The first juvenile courts focused on treating the accused in the home setting and 
keeping them out of detention centers. Chicago’s creation of a formal juvenile court inspired 
other states to follow suit, resulting in juvenile legal policies instituted in most states by 1925 
(Shepard, 1999). 
The Effects of Urbanization on Juvenile Delinquency Rates 
 During this time, crime data being considered and valued highlighted the urban poor as 
the population most susceptible to criminal activity. In their article, “Juvenile Delinquency and 
Urban Areas” (1942), Sociologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay examined the effects 
of urbanization within the city of Chicago. Their analysis of data collected since the opening of 
Chicago’s juvenile court house focused on statistics of adolescent crime and elucidated a pattern 
of criminal activity suggesting that particular districts within the city produced higher rates of 
juvenile contact with the court system than others, specifically those inhabited predominantly by 
first-generation immigrants. These areas were characterized by lower income per capita than 
other areas of the city, the physical deterioration of buildings, and close proximity to industry.  
As the city grew, areas within Chicago were distinguished from one another by their 
physical or economic characteristics or, at any given moment, by the composition of the 
populations. This finding was important in that it led researchers to hypothesize that criminal 
activity resulted not from personality traits of a specific group, but from social circumstances 
experienced by that group in a given period. This line of thought coincided with society’s belief 





behavior when oppressed and hence they were not innately criminal. This development 
highlighted the importance of considering risks associated with a childhood spent in social 
turmoil and insinuated a need for proper nurturance during that period of life. 
The Eighth Amendment’s Evolving Standards of Decency 
 The Trop v. Dulles (1958) case focused on the issue of proportional punishment. In 1944, 
the petitioner, an army private stationed in French Morocco, had escaped from detention, 
allegedly to evade disciplinary consequence. When he was found, he willingly returned to the 
stockade. He was subsequently court-martialed on the charge of desertion and sentenced to three 
years of labor. In 1952, the petitioner applied for a passport and was denied, the stated reason 
being that he was no longer a citizen based on the court’s decision. 
In this Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) case, Chief Justice Warren opined 
that the U.S. government needed to intervene in this kind of punishment, which had traditionally 
been under the jurisdiction of the military, and commented on this Eighth Amendment issue in 
the following way:  
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase “cruel and unusual” has not been detailed by 
this Court, but the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the  
Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice … The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to 
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of 
civilized standards … The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 






In short, Warren and the court found the punishment—loss of citizenship and the rights that 
normally accompany it—too severe for the client. 
A Move Away from Parens Patriae 
 Until 1960, the country’s evolving system for sentencing and detaining juveniles 
continued to capture the attention of policy makers. Despite the growing numbers of correctional 
facilities being built, the common belief at the time was that the system’s weaknesses were 
attributable to “insufficient resources, not concept” (McGarrell, 1988, p. 7). Interestingly, another 
pattern emerged as a concern for the federal judicial branch as SCOTUS issued opinions in two 
juvenile cases within a year of each other, both of which supported similar due process rights 
granted to adults. This shift, along with other factors, such as increased institutionalization, 
showed a movement away from the influence of parens patriae.  
A Clarification of Factors Involved in Waiving Juveniles to Adult Court 
SCOTUS’s determination after reviewing Kent v. United States in 1966 marked the 
emergence of some due process rights for juveniles. In 1961,14-year-old Morris Kent was taken 
into custody for allegedly breaking into the apartment of a woman and raping her. Police 
searched for him after matching his fingerprints with those found in the apartment. While he was 
being detained for suspicion of the crime, his counsel requested that Kent be psychologically 
examined. In proving that Kent suffered from a serious mental illness, the attorney intended to 
keep him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system, thereby ensuring that his client 
would be considered for its rehabilitative services. Additionally, under the codes of the juvenile 
sentencing guidelines, Kent would have been ordered to serve a considerably shorter sentence as 





In his appeal to the Supreme Court (Kent v. United States, 1966), Kent’s lawyer argued 
that Kent had not been given the consideration granted to juveniles under the law at that time. 
Specifically, he argued that: 
Petitioner’s detention and interrogation … were unlawful. He contends that the police 
failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act in that they failed to 
notify the parents of the child and the Juvenile Court itself … that petitioner was deprived 
of this liberty for about a week without the determination of probably cause which would 
have been required in the case of an adult … that he was interrogated by the police in the 
absence of counsel or parent … [and] without warning of his right to remain silent or 
advice as to his right to counsel. (Kent v. United States, 1966, section 551) 
Kent, however, was denied the rights given to both juveniles and adults at that time. 
Furthermore, despite defense counsel’s request for an investigation of mitigating factors, the 
judge ordered that Kent be tried in adult court. The judge declared that he had conducted a “full 
investigation” and waived Kent’s juvenile status; this put his case into the hands of the adult 
court system and he was thus subject to its harsher sentencing practices. Subsequently, the 
sentence given Kent was between 30 and 90 years. SCOTUS ultimately decided in Kent’s favor 
by stating that the lower court judge’s waiver of jurisdiction in this case was “invalid.” Kent was 
then allowed a new hearing on waiver (Kent v. United States, 1966). 
The text of the decision (Kent v. United States, 1966) handed down in this case contains a 
representative example of appropriate factors for waiving an adolescent’s right to be tried as a 
juvenile rather than in adult court. They were listed as:  
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection 





2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, 
or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight 
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint. 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a 
crime. 
6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable 
rehabilitation of the juvenile … by the use of procedures, services, and facilities 
currently available to the Juvenile Court. (Kent v. United States, 1966, sections  
566–567) 
The salient issue in this case was the formalized practice of waiving the juvenile status of 
young offenders, which gives the court permission to remove them from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile system and process their cases in adult court, meaning their sentences will be served in 
an adult penitentiary. Although the defendant was ultimately served by the particular result of 
this case, SCOTUS’s exploration of this matter would grant authority to prosecutors who would 
seek to take youth from the protection of the juvenile system, thus solidifying the stripping of 
rights previously granted to adolescents. 
An Alignment of Due Process Rights Gives Adolescents Similar Protections as Adults 
 Just one year later, in 1967, SCOTUS reviewed yet another juvenile matter, In Re Gault. 
The case involving Gerald Gault was a rejected appeal from the Arizona Supreme Court. In 





at that time. Gault had been on probation previously and was taken into custody at a juvenile 
detention center. Gault’s parents contended that he was not afforded the kind of due process 
rights that would have helped his case, including no formal notification of his charges, a lack of 
counsel, and an assigned sentence to six years in a training school. As an adult, he would have 
qualified for a sentence of several months. 
Justice Fortas elaborated on the acknowledgement that juveniles have been protected 
under a criminal system that distinguishes them from adults and provides a legal process that 
does not mirror the adult system. However, overall, he maintained that adolescents were better 
served by being granted the same rights as adults when being tried. He explained that the judicial 
forefathers had felt that giving children shorter sentences, detaining them separately from adults, 
and making an effort to educate them were measures ethically called for to keep individuals from 
spending their adult years languishing within the criminal justice system based on mistakes they 
had made in youth. However, he opined, this process, which derived its authority from parens 
patriae, was questionable: “The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to 
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky 
and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance” (In Re Gault, 1967, p. 17). Fortas further 
explained as follows: 
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system 
for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and 
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to say the least—debatable. (p. 18)  
Here, he criticized the assumption of protections offered since the time of early America. 
He expressed the intention of the court to authorize aligning the expectations of juvenile rights 





receiving unfair treatment, his decision nonetheless mandated a change in direction away from 
uniform protection of young offenders to those of adults. 
Sociologists Help Form First Federal Juvenile Delinquency Policies 
As was the case when the U.S. formal juvenile system was first created, the work of 
sociologists was considered heavily during policy development in the mid to late 1960s. For 
example, under the Kennedy administration, ideas generated by their empirical work helped 
guide the President’s focus on juvenile criminal justice issues at the federal level (McGarrell, 
1988). The President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967) used the 
ideas generated from Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) Strain Theory. The researchers postulated that 
tension experienced by those who could achieve through merit but are denied actual opportunity 
has created the conditions for a class of individuals inclined to commit deviant acts. In 1967, the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice drew guidance 
from Lemert’s Labeling Theory (1951) which advanced the notion that individuals who connect 
with the criminal justice system are more likely to continue doing so than those who never do. 
According to this theory, the negative judgment placed on these individuals by others and 
themselves influenced future negative behavior. The ideas derived from these studies suggested 
assigning fault to the social structure rather than individual character and called for the 
consideration of the developmental needs of young offenders. 
Summary: Childhood as a Protected Status 
 Overall, during the first half of the 20th century, the juvenile criminal system was 
characterized by a pattern of viewing the juvenile as belonging to a vulnerable population and in 
need of a process that provides parental guidance and, in essence, valuing both punishment and 





reformed individuals. Juvenile courts were concerned with drawing on the resources of the 
community to bring about this change. For example, the President’s Commission of 1967 “urged 
policies of decriminalization, diversion and deinstitutionalization” (McGarrell, 1988, p. 8). 
Similarly, the SCOTUS decisions from the mid-1960s granting juveniles the same due process 
rights as adults reflected a need for protection, albeit one that was slowly diminishing. As the 
country continued to witness increases in juvenile crime, however, the nurturing qualities 
intended in common law’s parens patriae began to more substantively fade. 
Just Desserts 
Trends Toward Formalization 
During the early 1970s, the legal system continued a largely informal, laissez-faire 
approach to dealing with juvenile delinquents. Diversion, a common approach used in managing 
young offenders, emphasized sourcing relationships between parents, police, and the community 
to handle rehabilitation of the youth (Seljan & Schneider, 1983). The intention behind diversion 
was to keep children out of the criminal justice system to the greatest extent possible. The 
Lyndon B. Johnson era Commission reports generally supported this approach while stating 
concerns about its informality: “There are grave disadvantages and perils … in that vast 
continent of sublegal dispositions” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 82).  
When it became apparent that diversion programs were failing to reduce the number of 
juvenile offenses, the legal community turned to the work of theorists who espoused a starkly 
different approach to juvenile justice than in the past (McGarrell, 1988). The ideas put forth 
called for policy creation that embraced the official processing of youth through the court 





similar to that of the adult penal system. The other change promoted by contemporary social 
theorists was deterrence through punishment. The idea was that juveniles would be more likely 
to abide the law after witnessing young offenders receiving longer sentences than they had been 
accustomed to in the past. This new approach to juvenile justice was incorporated into 
subsequent federal policies via influential associations. For example, the Institute of Judicial 
Administration–American Bar Association (1977) and the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force 
(1978) endorsed a departure from assessment of the resources needed for rehabilitation and 
supported sentencing based on prior convictions and the severity of the crime. In breaking with 
the past traditions of diversion programs and lower sentencing standards for juveniles, the 
emerging line of thought favored less overall protection of young offenders and was backed by 
some of the most powerful political forces in American politics. 
SCOTUS Protects Individual Factors 
 In the midst of the developing movement in the federal and state governments to remove 
protections for juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court’s review of the case Furman v. Georgia 
(1972) explored the standards for assigning the death penalty for a population they ultimately 
guaranteed safeguarding. At that point, the Court heard three combined cases at once: Furman v. 
Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas. The title case’s accounting runs as follows: 
Mr. Furman broke into a home and shot the owner of the home through a closed door. The owner 
died from the gunshot wound.  This combined SCOTUS case resulted in a 5–4 vote in favor of 
reversing the death penalty sentence for each one, with written opinions from each justice. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas invoked the precedent established through common law:  
The words “cruel and unusual” certainly include penalties that are barbaric. But the 





penalties, suggest that it is “cruel and unusual” to apply the death penalty—or any other 
penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, 
and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not 
countenance general application across the board. (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, sections 
244–245) 
The relevance here is that individual factors that make one defendant more vulnerable to harsher 
penalties than another now need be weighed, thus officially requiring consideration of details 
pertaining to social privilege when sentencing. 
The other concurring opinions generally mirrored a concern that each of the three cases 
involved young black men, two of whom were evaluated with cognitive impairments, and the 
observation that they had been given stricter sentences than others who held more socially 
privileged positions. The dissenting opinions voiced a warning that this particular decision would 
significantly restrict the practice of handing down death sentences under any conditions. Indeed, 
state courts were subsequently obliged to create a clearly defined list of standards to be used for 
any and all individuals eligible for a death sentence, thereby forcing courts to abdicate their 
power to send offenders to death row arbitrarily (Latzer, 1998). 
The decision in this case would become important in sentencing trends for juveniles over 
time in the sense that it pronounced the tendency of the court system to overly penalize 
defendants based on race. As would be seen in the years ahead, the power SCOTUS granted at 
this time to protect individuals from larger political forces was once again used in sentencing. 
Despite the growing political and legal pressure to treat juveniles and adults similarly within 
most areas of the criminal justice system, the highest court held firmly to maintain a more 






Washington State Takes the Lead in Legislating Stricter Laws 
 Washington State distinguished itself during this time period by completely rewriting its 
juvenile code to reflect the trend in thinking. The new code laid out minimum and maximum 
sentencing limits for convictions “with quite narrow sentence ranges in between” (Castellano, 
1986, p. 482).  It did away with adjudication for status offenders—those who had been involved 
in the court system for reasons other than criminal acts—such as running away from home, 
truancy, or underage drinking. Those individuals were instead sent to the Department of Health 
and Human Services for assistance (Castellano, 1986; Seljan & Schneider, 1983). While 
Washington did not eliminate diversion programs completely, it formalized the process to the 
extent that diversions became increasingly managed by the Department of Corrections via 
probation officers. Furthermore, diversions required the young defendant to sign an agreement 
which listed violation restrictions and allowed the court to add the current offense to their 
criminal history if the contract was breached.  
Once a juvenile was contacted by police, the new laws granted prosecutors the role of 
overseeing the intake process, during which they decided whether to file a petition (Castellano, 
1986). The intake assessment no longer took treatment needs into account; instead it focused on 
a “community accountability” approach in which the juvenile would atone for their crimes by 
repaying the community in some way and serving a sentence commensurate with the crime 
committed. The sentence’s range would ideally correspond to the law’s suggested guidelines, as 
opposed to the rationale of an individual judge.  
Washington State’s Revised Code represented a culmination and formalization of 





Instead of being treated and shielded from the kind of official documentation that could follow 
them in future proceedings, diverted youth were increasingly processed through official legal 
channels. Filing procedures became largely authorized by the prosecution. Young defendants 
were sentenced in a standardized fashion that incorporated less consideration of individual 
factors than before. In short, the line between the juvenile and adult criminal system in the state 
became more blurred than it had ever been. Many states subsequently followed suit in adjusting 
statutory policy.  
A Philosophical Examination of Punishment 
 French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1979) explored the manifestation of 
the effects of standardization and formalization within the penal system over its history:  
The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the 
disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In 
short, it normalizes. It is opposed, therefore, term by term, to a judicial penalty whose 
essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of 
laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, 
but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by hierarchizing, 
but quite simply by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of condemnation. (p. 
183) 
Foucault’s (1979) understanding of the evolution of the criminal justice system, applicable for 
both adults and juveniles, noted a pattern of the powerful de-emphasizing of unique factors that 
make up individual offenders and their cases. This trend had turned criminal punishment into a 
mechanized tool used to subjugate the underprivileged. Therefore, Foucault might have argued 





populations by establishing a standardized process for sentencing, actually served to formally 
deprive them of their chance to be recognized contextually during criminal proceedings in the 
future. 
Politics Motivate Sentencing 
 Researchers Schwartz, Steketee, and Butts (1991) analyzed the state of the juvenile 
justice system during the 1980s. They expressed concern about the trend toward treating 
juveniles as adults in sentencing because it was a response to a perception of growing numbers 
and seriousness of crimes, which did not bear out in reality (Cook & Laub, 1986; Galvin & Polk, 
1983). Their investigation into the statistics yielded the following conclusion:  
Even though popular perceptions of rising juvenile crime rates have been contradicted 
frequently by official statistics which show stable, or even declining rates, and despite the 
fact that juvenile incarceration rates seem to vary more by political boundaries than by 
the incidence of crime, the juvenile justice system inevitably responds to outside pressure 
by increasing the use of incarceration. (Schwartz et al., 1991, p. 382) 
Their work offered a critical analysis of the information that served as the foundation that 
policy developers used to rationalize increasingly harsher punishment of adolescent offenders, 
namely the assumption that young people were committing crimes at rates that required the 
criminal justice system to take steps to protect the public more stringently than in the past, 
resulting in the degradation of special rights for adolescents based on developmental needs. 
Reagan’s Influence in the 1980s 
 As president, Ronald Reagan did not appear to place a lot of interest in juvenile justice, 
and in fact attempted to abdicate responsibility. He recommended the federal government 





and private donations. According to Nancy Marion (1994), Reagan repeatedly tried to abolish 
federal funding, but Congress blocked his efforts.  
Reagan did, however, support stricter sentencing laws for all federal cases. In 1984, he 
promoted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which provided for a Sentencing Commission. 
This commission’s members were appointed by Reagan and tasked with producing guidelines for 
the Sentencing Reform Act. One commission recommendation included “structured judicial 
discretion” which meant, importantly, that judges in federal cases were no longer allowed 
discretion to choose from a wide sentencing range; instead, they were given narrower options 
(United States Sentencing Commission, n.d). The passing of this act represented the 
manifestation of standardized sentencing on a federal level, a trend that had been apparent in 
juvenile law since the 1970s. 
Competency Examined in Issuance of the Death Penalty 
 In 1986, SCOTUS reviewed Ford v. Wainwright (1986) in which Alvin Bernard Ford 
received the death penalty for murder. The issue of competency had not been raised until 1982 
when Ford was observed entertaining grandiose thoughts, believing, for example, that he was the 
Pope and affected by a conspiracy involving the Ku Klux Klan. He demonstrated confusion 
about his upcoming execution, stating that he would not be put to death because “he owned the 
prisons and could control the governor through mind waves” (section 403). In response to his 
attorney’s concern about his “competency as a condemned inmate,” the governor assigned a 
panel of psychiatrists to evaluate Ford (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, section 404).  
Each psychiatrist affirmed Ford’s (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986) delusional thought process 
but argued that he understood why he was being condemned to death and that he was going to be 





attorney sought an evidentiary hearing based on the discrepancy between the observations and 
conclusions drawn by the different mental health professionals assigned to evaluate Ford. This 
case was appealed until it reached SCOTUS for a determination of whether sentencing an 
“insane person” to death fell within the purview of “cruel and unusual punishment” (Ford v. 
Wainwright, 1986, section 405). 
Justice Marshall led the Court with his opinion that the execution of Ford while he 
exhibited signs of insanity was unconstitutional in keeping with the logic of common-law: 
For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of 
executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and 
stripped of his fundamental right to life … Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized 
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience 
or deity is still vivid today. (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, section 409) 
The decision in this case closely examined the meaning and importance of the issue of a 
defendant’s competency, a matter which would be applied more generally to criminal 
blameworthiness in future juvenile cases.  
Adolescents Considered Less Culpable Than Adults 
 In 1988, SCOTUS reviewed Thompson v. Oklahoma. The following facts are attributed. 
Along with three accomplices, 15-year-old William Wayne Thompson allegedly murdered his 
former brother-in-law. Reportedly, the four perpetrators attacked the deceased in response to his 
alleged abuse of both Thompson and his sister. An autopsy revealed the victim’s body bore two 
gunshot wounds, multiple stab wounds to the torso, and a broken leg. The victim’s body had 
been anchored to a concrete block and thrown in a river. Thompson was found guilty and 





Due to the prosecution’s introduction of inadmissible evidence during the trial, 
Thompson filed an appeal. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s decisions. The case was 
subsequently reviewed by SCOTUS upon which time Justice Stevens stated the following, 
referring to preceding cases: 
Thus, the Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to 
a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The 
basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, 
less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the 
consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to 
be motivated by peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted 
with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult. (Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
1988, section 835) 
Here, SCOTUS clarified the difference in culpability between juveniles and adults by 
virtue of developmental maturity. The Court proclaimed an important distinction in allowable 
sentencing of offenders based on age that was to then be used when evaluating future penalty 
assignments of all juveniles.  
The Supreme Court Changes Its Stance on Viewing Adolescents as Uniformly Less Culpable 
Than Adults  
Within a year, SCOTUS reviewed another juvenile murder. This case overturned the 





17-year-old, allegedly robbed, raped, and murdered a gas station attendant with an accomplice 
(Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989). A police officer’s account of how Stanford perceived the event was 
as follows:  
[H]e said, I had to shoot her, [she] lived next door to me and she would recognize me … I 
guess we could have tied her up or something or beat [her up] … and tell her if she tells, 
we would kill her … Then after he said that he started laughing. (as cited in Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 1989, p. 366)  
After Stanford was arrested, his rights as a juvenile defendant were waived. With his adult status, 
his case was eligible for the death penalty. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion on this 
case which upheld the lower’s court finding and changed its reasoning since Thompson: 
Granted, however, that a substantial discrepancy exists, that does not establish the 
requisite proposition that the death sentence for offenders under 18 is categorically 
unacceptable to prosecutors and juries. To the contrary, it is not only possible, but 
overwhelmingly probable, that the very considerations which induce petitioners and their 
supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause 
prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed. (Standford v. Kentucky, 
1989, section 374) 
The statements made in this opinion mirrored a lack of confidence felt by the public and 
politicians regarding the efficacy of treating juveniles as a protected class within the juvenile 
court system.  
Fear of the Super Predator 
 When he wrote the article “The Theory of Moral Poverty” (1995), criminologist John 





On the horizon … are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile  
super-predators. They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of 
physical violence for the most trivial reasons (for example, a perception of slight 
disrespect or the accident of being in their path). They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor 
the pain of imprisonment. They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code 
that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality. In prison or out, 
the things that super-predators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money—are 
their own immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them. So, for as long as their 
youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes “naturally”: murder, rape, rob, 
assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high. (p. 1) 
The term “super predator” is often cited in the literature of this subject matter. Dilulio 
(1995) articulated the concerns and suspicions of the public, legislators, and judicial leaders 
which was that the current juveniles were different than those who had been granted social 
protection in the past; that their violent behavior was so ingrained that they were beyond 
rehabilitation and the public was safest when they were imprisoned.  
It is with hindsight that observers of the political trend of that time period question the 
strong bipartisan support that politicians lent to promoting the power of increased criminal 
punishment across many spheres, deeply affecting the juvenile system of policing, prosecution, 
and detention. In an article written for The Atlantic, author Peter Beinart (2015) reflected on the 
common beliefs among legislators under the Clinton administration, highlighting the wide 
acceptance of increased punishment and as well as the death penalty: “In 1994, Clinton’s crime 





prison sentences and eliminated federal funding for inmate education—garnered the votes of 
every Democratic Senator except one” (p. 2). 
Beinart was referring to President Clinton’s leadership in advancing the country’s most 
comprehensive crime bill yet (U.S. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, n.d). The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 significantly increased funds for additional federal 
law enforcement agencies, police officers, and prison construction. It supported more punitive 
sentencing for drug and gang affiliated crimes, and endorsed harsher penalties for young 
offenders. Importantly, this new law officially provided for the exclusion of the juvenile court 
process for those charged with more serious offenses when it stated it “authorize[d] adult 
prosecution of those 13 and older charged with certain violent crimes” (The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act, 1994, p.1).  
This law, which was the product of bipartisan input, is often cited as one of the most 
powerful mechanisms for creating and populating prisons, often with minorities. Author 
Michelle Alexander (2011) examined the strong evidence of an emergence in the 1990s of “a 
new racial caste system,” which ultimately manifested in “mass incarceration” of African 
Americans. This influx of convictions was due in part to Democratic attempts to draw support 
from “swing voters.” Their pledges to “get tough on crime” were meant to appeal to voters who 
perceived the new rights afforded to African Americans by the Civil Rights movement as, 
“require[ing] real sacrifices on the part of white Americans” (Alexander, 2011, p. 55). 
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a research report called The State 
Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime. The report claimed that since the 1992 
legislative sessions regarding juvenile justice issues, only two other moments in the past 100 





court system itself; and (b) the Gault decision that gave juveniles the same due process rights as 
adults. The concerns of the 1990s involved the “escalating juvenile arrests for violent crime and 
public perception of a violent juvenile crime epidemic” (U.S. Department of Justice. 1996, p. xi).  
The response to these concerns were outlined in significant changes in state laws that 
tended to blur the lines of the juvenile and criminal courts in several ways. In general, the states 
were more likely to transfer juvenile cases to criminal court. For example, some states modified 
the waiver requirements laid out in Kent: “11 states lowered the age limit for one or more 
offenses, 10 states added crimes, and 2 states added prior record provisions” ((U.S. Department 
of Justice. 1996, p. 4). Some states added “presumptive waivers,” which burdened the young 
defendant to prove he or she was amenable to treatment offered in a juvenile detention setting in 
order to avoid the adult system.  
Summary: Just Desserts 
 From the early 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century, one can observe a palpable 
fear based on a perceived increase in juvenile crime. The overwhelming response to this concern 
was to dismantle the privileges adolescent defendants were granted in favor of placing more 
power in the hands of law enforcement, i.e., police officers and prosecutors. This response also 
led to an increase in numbers of juvenile court cases formally processed through the adult system 
and a decline in rehabilitation services offered. However, as more forensic research was 
conducted, criticism of the data used to mandate the changes that blurred the lines between 
juveniles and adults in the criminal justice system began to emerge. Furthermore, the revelation 
of brain development research highlighted differences in levels of culpability between teenagers 
and adults and indicated the adolescent’s responsivity to rehabilitation. The addition of this new 





A Return to Protection 
Researchers Voice Concern Over Trend to Strip Juvenile Protections 
 J.J. Shook (2005) not only reiterated Foucault’s belief about the increasingly oppressive 
forces operating within today’s penal system, but explored specifically how this stance affects 
juveniles in prison. What was once taken for granted, in his view, is that the juvenile court 
system treated youth as separate: 
From adults, with special needs and vulnerabilities, and [that] its widespread 
implementation served to further crystallize and shape these shifting notions. In this way, 
the development of the juvenile court established a distinctive boundary between the 
worlds of juveniles and adults (Shook, 2005, p. 468).  
Shook (2005) went on to highlight a growing concern about how juveniles in the criminal system 
are treated. Though juveniles were once considered vulnerable due to developmental immaturity, 
resulting in less capacity to form criminal intentions, that paradigm is changing. Over the last 
several decades, juveniles had increasingly been sentenced in the United States as adults and not 
afforded the opportunity to reform once they were imprisoned. 
Public Opinion and Sentencing 
 In research that sought to measure public opinion about the death penalty for juveniles, 
Vogel and Vogel (2003) asserted that the country had developed a growing tendency to “get 
tough” on crime in sentencing practices. Data collected from public opinion polls between 1985 
and 2000 showed that most Americans (66–80%) agreed when presented with the question of 
whether capital punishment was the best dispositional outcome for the crime of murder. 
However, when the option of life without parole was included as an alternative, fewer 





Robert M. Bohm (1991) analyzed Gallup Poll data obtained from 1936 to 1986 by 
respondents’ socioeconomic background. He surmised, “Whites, wealthier individuals, 
westerners, Republicans, and males” supported the death penalty more often than did other 
segments of the population (as cited in Vogel & Vogel, 2003, p. 171). The 1991 numbers showed 
a shift for “wealthier” and “westerner” responses toward decreased favor for capital punishment.  
Studies conducted on public opinion concerning juveniles and death penalty revealed that 
respondents are less likely to endorse a death penalty sentence for a juvenile than for an adult. 
For example, Moon et al. (2000) found that 80% of participants chose the death penalty for 
adults. Fifty-three percent of the same group favored the same sentence for adolescents. In a 
separate study, Cullen et al. (2000) concluded that public opinion displayed a bias toward harsh 
sentences for young offenders; however, once mitigating factors were presented for 
consideration, sentencing tended to be more lenient.  
Vogel and Vogel (2003) stated that the criminal justice system appeared to be divided into 
dichotomous pathways regarding adolescent offenders. On the one hand, for decades, public 
opinion and the majority of the legislation passed reflected a tendency to punish more harshly in 
general, perceiving juveniles less as wards of the state, and thus to be sentenced increasingly as 
adults. Simultaneously, studies of brain development conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s 
presented evidence that juvenile behavior is affected by brain development in a way that would 
make offenders more likely to commit crimes than an adult. Among the conclusions drawn based 
on empirical analyses are the following: juveniles are more impulsive than adults (Grisso, 1996); 
they have less ability to foresee the consequences of their actions (Gardner & Herman, 1990); 






Contextual Factors Considered 
 Steinberg and Scott (2003) were similarly concerned about the increasingly punitive 
sentences being handed down to juveniles for both egregious crimes, such as killing, and much 
lesser ones. They pointed to the invocation of the death penalty for juveniles and the detention of 
juveniles in adult facilities as important issues for public discourse. They also highlighted the 
irony in its concurrence with the emerging science that indicated that the juvenile brain functions 
differently than the adult brain, thus raising the question as to whether juveniles are as “culpable” 
and appropriately considered in sentencing decisions. Essential to understanding the authors’ 
viewpoint was the distinction they drew between “excuse” and “mitigation” in legal proceedings: 
“Unlike excuse, which calls for a binary judgment … mitigation places the culpability of a guilty 
actor somewhere on a continuum of criminal culpability and, by extension, a continuum of 
punishment” (Steinberg & Scott, 2003, p. 1010).  
Three specific areas to be considered in mitigation include: (a) factors that influence 
capacity, such as cognitive or mental impairments (Kadish, 1987; Steinberg & Scott, 2003); (b) 
behavior that can be weighed against the way a “reasonable” individual would act given a similar 
situation (Morse, 1994; Steinberg & Scott, 2003); and (c) information that implies that the 
criminal behavior was “out of character” for the defendant and suggests that the defendant was 
otherwise productive and respectful of the rule of law (Steinberg & Scott, 2003, p. 1011). The 
conclusion drawn by the authors is that socially just rulings would consider the contextual factors 
of individual defendants while sentencing. 
Compared: The Cognitive Abilities of Juveniles and the Intellectually Impaired 
 In 2005’s federal court case, Roper v. Simmons, the influence of brain development 





17-year-old Christopher Simmons. The facts allege that he and two peers broke into the home of 
the victim. When found, Simmons reportedly recognized her from a previous car accident and 
decided at that point to murder her. The three teens bound her hands, taped over her eyes and 
mouth, and threw her into a river where she drowned. Among the charges laid were kidnapping, 
burglary, and murder in the first degree, for which the state sought the death penalty. As 
Simmons was 17 years old at the time of the crime, his counsel raised his age as an important 
mitigating factor when considering capital punishment. Nonetheless, Simmons was ultimately 
found guilty and sentenced to death.  
A new attorney was assigned the Simmons case and attempted to obtain post-conviction 
relief, mainly based on the grounds of ineffective counsel. New testimony included statements 
from a psychologist who had evaluated him as well as from his friends and neighbors. This new 
picture presented revealed the defendant as “very immature,” “very impulsive,” and “very 
susceptible to being manipulated or influenced” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, section 558). Despite 
this argument, the Missouri State Supreme Court ultimately denied post-conviction relief. 
This case again grabbed the attention of the State Supreme Court after it had been 
established in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) that death sentences were unconstitutional for 
intellectually impaired individuals because they violated Eighth Amendment protections. Based 
on this new federal precedent, the Missouri State Supreme Court agreed to reverse his death 
sentence.  
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion denying the Petitioner’s request to reverse the 
latest Missouri Supreme Court decision to relieve Simmons of his death sentence. He reiterated 





The objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death 
penalty in the majority of the States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on 
the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—provide 
sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles in the words Atkins used 
respecting the mentally retarded as “categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.” (section 567; Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S., section 316) 
The decision in this case highlighted issues of cognitive deficiencies in sentencing by equating 
the culpability levels of the intellectually impaired and juvenile offenders.  
“Twice Diminished Culpability” 
 In another case, SCOTUS (Graham v. Florida, 2010) reviewed the issue of whether a 
minor could be held as responsible as an adult for a crime, and therefore sentenced as such. The 
crime under review involved 17-year-old Terrance Jamar Graham who was on probation for 
convictions of armed burglary and assault when he was charged with two separate robberies on 
the same night. That evening, he had two teenaged accomplices with him. During the second 
robbery, one of his accomplices was shot. Graham drove him to the hospital and dropped him 
off. When he attempted to drive away, he was approached by police. Instead of stopping for the 
officer, he sped away, drove his car into a telephone pole, and was caught by police when he 
tried to run away. Graham was subsequently charged and found guilty of armed robbery and 
attempted armed robbery on that night. Graham’s sentence of life without parole was the 
maximum possible. The trial judge justified the sentencing decision as such: 
Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you 





can do now is try and protect the community from your actions. (Graham v. Florida, 
2010, section 2020) 
Justice Kennedy delivered SCOTUS’ opinion, which denied the lower court’s ruling to 
sentence a juvenile to life-without-parole for a non-homicidal crime, by referring to the same 
reasoning offered in the Roper case (Roper v. Simmons, 2005) which spoke of culpability and 
severity of punishment: 
As petitioner’s amici papers written in support of his position by interested parties 
outside the lawsuit point out, development in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds … Juveniles are more 
capable of change than are adults ... It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, 
a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability. (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, section 2027) 
This SCOTUS decision further revealed an increasing importance placed upon the consideration 
of the mitigating and rehabilitation factors in juvenile criminal cases.  
A Link Between Psychiatric Disorders and Prison 
 King et al. (2011) contended that a sample of juveniles residing in juvenile detention 
centers had suffered from many mental disorders before being admitted. The mental disorders 
seemed to correlate with a history of mental, physical, and sexual abuse experienced in 
childhood. Most detainees were noted to suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), substance abuse, disruptive disorders, and anxiety. Ng et al. (2011) asserted that 
incarceration caused greater depression among juvenile inmates sentenced to adult facilities than 
among those in juvenile centers, which raises questions about the services offered in one 





assigned to the adult system is internalized by those inmates, giving them a sense that their 
crimes were worse than those who were not sent into the adult system, and that they suffer more 
mentally and emotionally as a result.  
Criteria for Life Without Parole Sentences Limited 
 In 2003, Evan Miller was 14 years old when he was charged with killing his neighbor. 
The facts of this Federal Supreme Court case were presented as the following: Miller and a 
friend were at his home when a neighbor came by to make a drug deal with Miller’s mother. The 
two boys went back to the neighbor’s house and smoked marijuana with him. After the neighbor 
fell asleep, Miller went through his wallet and took money out of it. When he tried to put it back, 
the neighbor woke and “grabbed him by the throat” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, section 2462). 
Miller’s friend struck the victim with a baseball bat and Miller took the bat and beat him more. 
The two boys then left the neighbor in his home while they lit fire to it. The victim died of smoke 
inhalation and injuries. Miller was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
SCOTUS voted to overturn the sentence. Justice Kagan offered the following argument in 
support of its position: 
[T]he mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentence from taking account 
of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a 
juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws 
prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of 
imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, 
section 2466) 
The decision in this case not only restricted life-without-parole sentencing for juveniles, it 





options. SCOTUS’s position distanced itself from the mandatory sentencing practices used since 
the 1970s for juveniles. 
2014 Washington State Senate Bill 5064 
 Washington State Senate Bill 5064 was passed in February 2014 in direct response to the 
SCOTUS Miller v. Alabama decision of 2012 which held that juveniles being sentenced to life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole or release violated the Constitution’s Eighth 







CHAPTER III: METHODS 
Project Purpose 
This project examined the lived experience of Washington State juvenile justice 
policymakers and activists navigating complex, shifting juvenile sentencing laws in the adult 
court system since the Miller v. Alabama (2012) landmark case. During a doctoral course in 
qualitative research, I was engaged in a group project that set out to study the lived experiences 
of individuals who gave testimony during the presentation of Washington State’s Senate Bill 
5064 to the State Senate. The purpose of this bill was to create compliance with the changes in 
federal law mandated by the federal supreme court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama of 2012 
(Senate Bill Report 2SSB-5064). The legal changes mandated by this ruling involved topics that 
provoked curiosity. The group was particularly interested in the investigation because of its focus 
on issues related to social justice, brain development science, and therapeutic treatment. By 
studying the experiences of those who testified on behalf of the state’s adaptation of the Federal 
Supreme Court ruling, the group gained rich insight into the human experience of advocating for 
juveniles. To that end, the group chose a Descriptive Phenomenological research design. It is a 
qualitative method used in psychological research and will be further discussed below (Creswell, 
2014). The information sought from the study’s participants focused on their shared experience 
about what it meant to be involved in the formulation of new legislation that had the potential of 
significantly changing the life course of many juvenile offenders.  
Qualitative Research Design 
In describing the difference between qualitative and quantitative studies, Creswell (2014) 





a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation” (p. 
4). To that end, I endeavored to treat the historical background of sentencing in juvenile criminal 
matters with a focus on data to reveal the unique experiences of the selected participants. By 
choosing a phenomenological design, I hoped to delve more deeply into individual experiences 
than a quantitative study allowed. Such a design also required the investigator to allow 
discovered themes to guide the study and subsequent report, and not the other way around. 
Moustakas’ (1994) approach to phenomenological studies involves the following ideas:  
1. Choice of a procedure that highlights a shared experience; 
2. Bracketing bias by recording the lived experience of the investigators on their chosen 
topic; 
3. Collection of data through interviews; 
4. Selecting interview questions that are open-ended; 
5. Coding themes and significant statements from the data.  
These steps call for an attitude of receptivity to knowledge, which is not presumed but is 
discovered. 
Phenomenology and Essence 
It was with hope of advancing the discovery of truth that the philosopher Edmund 
Husserl put forth the idea of a new investigative approach (Moules et al., 2015). His intention 
was not to debunk popular methodologies driven by “scientism” or that which is revealed 
through purely empirical research, but to contribute a philosophical lens for arriving at 
knowledge and truth. He asserted that through phenomenological reduction the research would 
elucidate the essence of an experience, which he described as “an object of a new type. Just as 





intuition is a pure essence” (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 12). Husserl believed that this kind of 
knowledge-gathering need not replace research derived from a scientific methodology. Instead, 
such research would be enhanced by allowing the revelation of the essence to guide the way 
toward increased understanding and, consequently, more studies, whether they be empirically or 
phenomenologically-based. The rationale for choosing this methodology, which seeks to reveal 
the human experience, is that it serves to complement research that relies on reductionism by 
revealing information that cannot be considered within the realm of traditional scientific study. 
Concepts offered by Amedeo Giorgi (2012), the creator of the Descriptive Phenomenological 
research design, emphasized the importance of its addition to the field of psychology:  
The spirit of science would be respected but it would be implemented with methods and 
concepts different from the natural sciences because the subject matter—human persons 
and relationships—had characteristics different from the object of natural  
sciences—things and processes. (p. 4) 
Giorgi’s Adaptation of Husserl’s Ideas 
 Giorgi (2009) took Husserl’s ideas about methodology as a guide when he developed the 
descriptive phenomenological method. This approach, he asserted, “draws upon the intersection 
of three intellectual movements: phenomenological philosophy, science and psychology” 
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 1). He claimed that the field of psychology had been adjunctive to philosophy 
in that its research methods drew upon those used in that discipline. At the close of the 19th 
century, psychological investigation increasingly aligned itself with methodology used in the 
natural sciences instead. Giorgi (2009) contended that the shift toward the natural sciences 
advanced the field because “measurement processes have to be applied to the data; and some 





analyzed in this way “are not applicable to the full range of phenomena,” and, “consciousness is 
the prime, but not only example. Memories, images, dreams, hallucinations, and the like 
are…examples” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, Giorgi (2009) explained that his adapted 
approach is “a method for investigating the structure of consciousness and the types of objects 
that present themselves to consciousness” (p. 87). He strove to convert Husserl’s purely 
philosophical approach to consciousness into a scientific one. 
Bracketing 
 Giorgi (2009) upheld Husserl’s endorsement of bracketing, or the inclusion of statements 
reflecting the investigator’s bias that could influence their findings. He claimed that, in addition 
to omitting observation and analysis related to natural sciences, what makes the 
phenomenological method distinctive is that the researcher presents information to the reader 
about their own relevant experience pertaining to the subject being studied. The rationale behind 
“bracketing is the notion that past knowledge about whatever is presently given is also put aside 
so that unprejudiced attention can be directed to what is present in the current act of 
consciousness being considered” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 10). 
This Researcher’s Bias 
 I was born into a family of political activists. My parents were politically liberal and 
believed that the dominant culture oppressed individuals with minority status. Both of my 
parents opposed the Vietnam War, for example, and organized against it by protesting. I observed 
my mother campaign for candidates in local elections. I remember her leaving me with friends 
when I was young so that she could march in Washington, D.C. for the Equal Rights 
Amendment. I became of age to vote on the day of the 1988 presidential election.  My mother 





the election process. Political activism is, so to speak, in my blood. Therefore, I am interested in 
what makes people decide to spend their personal and professional time advocating for change. 
Additionally, I worked as an investigator for the public defenders’ office and witnessed the 
effects that harsh sentencing practices had on my indigent clients. I am, therefore, sensitive to the 
suffering caused by what I considered a system of disproportionate treatment for people who 
lived in poverty, both adults and juveniles. To be clear: my professional experiences have 
influenced me in such a way as to reject the notion of sentencing juveniles as adults. 
Procedure 
The procedure of this project involved several steps.  First, the investigator completed an 
Internal Review Board (IRB) application.  In it, ethical issues related to conducting the research 
were outlined.   
When the interviews were conducted, I met with each participant at an agreed upon 
location and time, and provided a private and professional interview environment. The proposed 
meeting forum was a reserved classroom at the Antioch University Seattle campus or at the 
participant’s office. Due to restrictions mandated to isolate during the pandemic of 2020, most of 
the interviews were conducted over the phone. 
The Interviews 
 Interviews within the descriptive phenomenological framework were open-ended, 
exploratory (Giorgi, 2009). Appendix A shows the list of questions asked to each participant. 
This style of questioning sought to discern if the participant is “revealing an aspect of how he or 
she was present in the situation,” which was the desired data in descriptive phenomenological 
research (Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). Giorgi (2009) also contended that this can be a difficult task 





interviewer is encouraged to “use common sense” and direct the conversation back to the topic 
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). The focus of the interviews were to learn about aspects of the individuals’ 
experience that have influenced their advocacy in legislation for adolescents in the adult judicial 
system.  
Participants  
Pursuant to Creswell’s (2013) description of phenomenological research design and 
recommendations for sound methodology, the selected six participants were found on the list of 
those who testified for Washington State Senate Bill 5064. I searched for their contact 
information through the internet and sent an email with a request for an interview. If I did not 
manage to contact them through email, I called their offices.  
It is important to note that only two participants returned their demographics information 
forms. I speculated the reasoning being that information it provided may have decreased the 
ability to remain anonymous. Because the group of participants was so small and, indeed, is the 
“world” they inhabit politically and professionally, omitting personal information may have been 
motivated by prudence. 
Exclusion criteria. Individuals who were listed in the bill but did not testify were 
excluded from this study. 
All available contextual information provided about the listed individuals such as their 
respective agencies of employment, their positions, status and rank within their agencies, and 
how they voted in response to the Bill’s various elements were taken into consideration by the 
investigator during participant selection. Specifically, the proposed participants were adults who 





new state law that would reform sentencing guidelines for juveniles who were previously 
considered for life-without-parole sentences. 
Participant selection. Once potential participants were chosen and contacted, they were 
asked to volunteer their time without any possibility of compensation. Each participant was 
asked to fill out a demographic information form as well (see Appendix C). The participants 
were contacted by phone and email. They were also sent a confidentiality form (see Appendix 
B). 
Recruitment. The professional contact information for all participants was available 
online. There was slight variation in terms of how they could be reached (e.g., phone, email, or 
via administrative assistant), and how long it would take to get in contact and obtain a verbal 
agreement to participate. I informed my respective participants they were personally selected for 
interviews about their experience testifying for Senate Bill 5064. I identified myself as a clinical 
psychology doctoral student at Antioch University Seattle, and stated that the interviews were 
being requested as part of a dissertation research study. The participants were informed that the 
purpose was to explore the lived experience of legal professionals and/or juvenile justice 
advocates who were involved in the passage of Senate Bill 5064. The prospective interviews 
were described in terms of their open-ended, exploratory style, and personal information about 
their experience was requested. All six participants were given time to consider participating in 
an interview after all preliminary information about the nature and purpose of the research study 
was provided. Such information included the researchers’ declarations that participation was 
voluntary and not subject to compensation of any kind as well as that confidentiality would be 





Confidentiality. Each participant was given a confidentiality and consent form to sign. It 
included an outline of the study’s plans for managing the issues of confidentiality. The 
participants and the interviewer both filled in the two signature lines on the consent form (see 
Appendix B). One signature line was meant to ensure protection of interview information while 
the other is to provide consent to be audio recorded. The investigator stated her agreement to 
disallow identifiable information from any and all written reports about the research. These 
included written submissions and subsequent edits as intended for professional publication. The 
interviews (recordings and transcripts) and related materials were stored on encrypted computers.   
Risks. Because the chosen participants had already testified in open court proceedings 
about their opinions and beliefs on the topic, it was believed the anonymous and individual 
discussion forum of this research would be less stressful, albeit difficult to discuss emotions tied 
to the experience of having advocated for juveniles. To mitigate any such potential issues, 
questions were sent to interviewees in advance of the interview. By doing so, the investigator 
aimed to spare participants the experience of being surprised by what is being asked as well as to 
give them each a chance to mentally and emotionally process their feelings before discussing the 
experience. 
Benefits. This research would add to the fields of psychology and law by illuminating the 
history of juvenile legal regulations and the shared experience of those who advocated for reform 
within the juvenile criminal justice system. More specifically, this study would enhance the 
fields’ understandings of the experience of those who were involved in the development of 
important policy changes that affected a vulnerable population. 
Protections. The rights of the participants were soundly protected by measures taken to 





coded with a participant number. Only the investigator had the participant number coding list. It 
was kept confidential and password protected on the researcher’s computer. Each participant was  
informed of their right to ask that particular pieces of shared information not be incorporated into 
the research and analysis. 
Additionally, each participant was provided an informed consent document (see 
Appendix B). To protect the participants’ signatures, paper copies of the informed consent forms 
were stored in a locked file cabinet. The informed consent form included information on the 
intent to use audio recording equipment while interviewing, and required a separate signature.  
Steps to the Descriptive Method 
Data Collection 
 As stated earlier, according to the precepts of the descriptive method, Giorgi (2009) 
stated, “what one seeks from a research interview … is as complete a description as possible” (p. 
x) about the phenomenon experienced. The investigator needs to inquire about the impressions of 
the specific set of circumstances the participants encountered. If the assessment is that he or she 
has not, the researcher will need to steer the interview toward this theme. The interview itself 
should also be as long as needed in order to capture the experience, but should not go beyond 
this point because “a sense of proportion relative to the phenomenon being studied is required” 
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 124).  
Transcription 
 Each interview was recorded on two separate recording devices. The second device was 
used as a back-up in the event one malfunctioned. One copy of the interview was downloaded on 
to the investigator’s encrypted computer. The other copy of the interview was deleted. The 





identified by a code in order to ensure confidentiality. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was used to 
create the notations required in descriptive phenomenological design (explained below). 
Data Analysis 
 The underlying goal of data analysis in Giorgi’s (2009) descriptive method is to label 
what appears on the surface to the investigator. It does not ask for the researcher to address 
“ambiguities.” The idea is to provide descriptions from data in which information is “given” and 
does not warrant a perspective that strives to interpret meaning (Giorgi, 2009, p. 127).  
Reading for a Sense of the Whole 
The first step in analyzing the data came through transcribing the interview recordings. 
The researcher then reads through the transcribed text. The goal at this stage was to “be sensitive 
to the implications of the data for the phenomenon being researched” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 128). The 
first read should not provide an established sense of the whole description; this is expected to 
happen later on in the process. Instead, it is seen as an opportunity to peer at the data to “get a 
sense of the whole while sensitively discriminating the intentional objects of the lifeworld 
description provided by the participant” (Giorgi, 2009, pp. 128–129). This was how the 
investigator began to arrive at the description using the lens of phenomenological scientific 
reduction. 
Determination of Meaning Units 
 According to Giorgi (2009), the next step was to read the transcribed interview again in 
order to separate descriptions into “parts.” Each of these “meaning units” were studied for the 
presence of psychological meaning and not for grammatical meaning per se. The information 
drawn also reflected the phenomenon being studied. The investigator chose what constitutes 





the task” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 130). Some authors argue that this dynamic creates subjectivity. 
Giorgi contended, however, that this lack of objectivity does not “carry … theoretical weight” 
since the next step involves addressing the “transformation” of the parts and that provides the 
descriptions with significant meaning. At this point, the researcher reread the interview 
transcripts, noting descriptions and passages where “a significant shift in meaning” occurs 
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 130). Herein lay the production of meaning units.   
Transformation of Participant’s Natural Attitudinal Expressions Into  
Phenomenologically-Sensitive Expressions 
 In this next step, the objective was to read through the interview transcript again with the 
intention of transforming meaning units into “structures” that further refine “the psychological 
dimension of experience” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 131). Giorgi claimed that, in order to label these parts 
using the phenomenological descriptive method, the investigator would approach the raw data 
with a psychological mindset. In other words, in order to adopt this lens, the researcher seeks 
information that reveals psychological significance and would label the expressions that did so, 
just as a descriptive study involving mathematical concepts would highlight data with 
mathematical significance and would require a “mathematical attitude” (p. 131).  
Giorgi (2009) asserted the steps taken in the transformation of meaning units assure a 
measure of validity: “the results of the descriptive approach imply strong knowledge claims 
because the results include descriptions of findings rather than theories or hypotheses;” 
furthermore, “the second-order descriptions that constitute structures have the strength of facts” 
(p. 131). Since the data pulled was based on information that was taken at face value, Giorgi 
argued that it is more valid than information based on conjecture, as in, for example, an 





the noted transformed meaning units with the “critical other” to ensure an acceptance of the 
newly labeled structure (p. 131). 
As stated earlier, the meaning units were considered within a psychological framework. 
Giorgi (2009) stated, “The researcher is reading the participant’s description, but within the 
reduction he or she awakens the phenomenal characteristics of the description, which in turn 
makes the senses of the described experiences more available” (p. 133). The technique for 
discerning meaning units involved a “procedure of free imaginative variation” in which the 
investigator searched for an “invariant sense” among descriptions. The aim was to note the 
invariant sense and “test” it by returning to the particular data part and reconsider whether it 
captures the phenomenological psychological essence that adds “to the total structure” of what is 
being studied (Giorgi, 2009, p. 133). This was the meaning of transformation in this context, and 
it was carried through until each description was so developed.  
Reliability 
 Golafshani (2003) asserted reliability in quantitative and qualitative studies is measured 
differently. While the worth of a quantitative study is tied to the ability to produce a study that 
yields similar results when reproduced, a qualitative study’s reliability rests in the 
“trustworthiness” of the researcher’s method (p. 601). While quantitative studies aim to reveal 
concrete ideas relating to “causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings,” the 
qualitative investigation strives to contribute “illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to 
similar situations” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 600). However, he contended, qualitative studies ought 
to follow the tenets of a quantitative study insofar as they uphold the necessary “trustworthiness, 
rigor and quality” required to “eliminate bias and increase the researcher’s truthfulness of a 





researcher conduct the study with these goals in mind because, unlike in a quantitative study, 
there are no measurement data to support a study’s results. Indeed, the primary tool in qualitative 
work is the researcher herself (Patton, 2002). It is important to note that in a descriptive 
phenomenological design, the researcher is required to limit their bias and to invite feedback 
from other researchers about findings, which makes this particular qualitative design more 
objective than others (Giorgio, 2009). In this case, the researcher did not approach the data with 
her own prior impressions in mind and invited feedback from others about her analysis. These 
measures support research that approaches objectivity and were performed in this study. 
There is a specific mindset the investigator should apply toward the crucial matter of 
trustworthiness that makes the investigative design hold up to scientific standards, to the extent 
that a qualitative study can (Golafshani, 2003). I applied diligent effort toward maintaining 
“neutrality” (p. 601) by bracketing my prior experiences and impressions of the subject matter. I 
strove to bracket during interactions with participants. For example, by conducting the interviews 
with an openness to the information offered, I limited interference from my preconceived ideas 
and biases. I practiced “consistency” by following the same procedural guidelines for all 
participants at every step (p. 601). They were recruited and interviewed in the manner described 
earlier. Each interview transcript was read through and noted using the same psychological 
mindset and computer programs. And I practiced “transferability” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601) by 
generating data results that were easy to explain to the “critical other” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 128). 
When closely following the tenets of the above method, the rationale behind labeling the data all 







 Maxwell (1992) contended that generalizability is not necessarily an achievable goal for 
the qualitative study. In this particular study, for example, the results will not have applicability 
to individuals outside of this investigation. The participants chosen for this study were present 
for the argument of a bill in the Washington State Senate to provide opinions that were unique to 
them. These opinions were shaped by experiences that developed over a specific time period and 
for different personal and professional purposes (for example, one may be a defense lawyer 
whereas another may be a parole officer). Therefore, generalizability to a larger group is limited. 
However, Giorgi (2009) argued that, when using the descriptive phenomenological method, the 
shared phenomena highlighted by one group of similar makeup should apply to another. In this 
case, for example, if I was to examine the shared experiences of advocates who testified in 
another state’s legislative process to comply with the decision handed down in Miller v. Alabama 






CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
After gathering and analyzing the data from six interviews obtained from those who 
testified for Bill 5064, essential psychological meanings were derived. The data uncovered nine 
such meanings according to Giorgi’s (2009) Descriptive Phenomenology. The meanings are 
listed below: 
1. Influence. Participants expressed desire or obligation to influence the process. 
 
2. Culpability. The culpability of the adolescent was considered a factor in formulating 
new sentencing guidelines. 
 
3. Science. The latest developmental brain science shaped the new law. 
 
4. Compromise and negotiation. Participants used compromise and negotiation ultimately 
as means to advancing their own interests. 
 
5. Individual Rights. Considering individual rights was important in developing the new 
policy. 
 
6. Public Safety. Public safety concerns were valued. 
 
7. Vulnerability. Adolescents were regarded as developmentally vulnerable. Some sought 
to sentence and detain them separately from adults. 
 
8. Rehabilitation. Adolescents were viewed as capable of rehabilitation and worthy of the 
opportunity while detained. 
 
9. Collaboration. Collaboration between all sides was considered a key element in passing 








CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Through using Giorgi’s (2009) descriptive method, the researcher recognized eight 
essential meanings, which were parsed after following the required steps mentioned earlier in 
this paper. They are briefly listed and described below.  
Influence 
 Participants were motivated to testify for the bill formation because they had a 
professional obligation to do so, were personally motivated based on a value system, or a 
combination of both.  
For P2, it was essential that their influence was as accurate a reflection as possible of 
those for whom they represented during the process: 
It was really within my role as the legislative co-chair of the association of prosecutors. 
Because it was bill of high interest to prosecutors that was part of my role was to be a 
communicator to the legislature about what the association’s viewpoint was. When we 
work internally, we have a discussion and try to be in a place where there are certain 
points where we can be in consensus and be on point and then that is the message that 
gets conveyed to the legislature so my role is to do that but to do that without getting 
astray and into saying things and making statements that the group hadn’t endorsed. 
P3 regarded their influence as important in that the imprint they wanted to make on the 
final bill was, ultimately, largely actualized. Additionally, the final bill has proven to be effective: 
We had a legislative agenda every year to follow and then we respond to the bills that 
come for about five other entities. In 5064, we had a draft of the main points that we 
wanted to see preserved and we went into it knowing that the legislature probably would 
not just rubber stamp what we had. They would want to make it their own. So, we went 
in expecting it to be changed. But, actually, I was very gratified that the bill came out 
fairly close to what we suggested at the beginning. I put it on my resume as one of my 
most significant legislative accomplishments because we were kind of out on the edge 
there in terms of trying to participate, what the pressures would be and how to best 
respond to them. And I have to say that I’m not in the business anymore but my 
understanding is that the system that has been put in place since 5064 is working pretty 
well. 
P5 believed their influence offered a crucial voice because they were once in a position of 





I always prepared my own testimony because the lawyer was going to do their job based 
on their research. All the experts who’ve not been to prison will get up there and talk 
about what they don’t know. I just find that it is more authentic if it just came from me 
because I truly lived in this world of prison. And I just don’t think that anybody else 
would be able to have it come across the way I want it if someone else wrote it. 
 
P5 also expressed doubt that their influence was being considered, mainly because they 
were not certain their testimony was noted: 
I guess there’s a – if they were listening, then my effectiveness would be great, I think. 
But I can’t tell you how many times I’ve traveled to Olympia to testify and there’s only 
one person sitting there or by the time it comes to some kind of criminal justice matter to 
be talked about the whole panel leaves that was already there. There were other people 
there for the hearing prior to us and one person stays and then they say “Oh, this will be 
recorded. Don’t worry, they’ll watch it.” I’ve been told that so many times. It’s a little 
frustrating. If they’re there or they’re watching the video and listening, I think it would be 
effective. 
P6 acknowledged the influence of other individuals and agencies as bearing more weight 
on the process than their own: 
I don’t know if it’s possible to evaluate the effectiveness of my sole influence on the bill 
or -----------‘s influence on the bill just because there were a coalition of juvenile justice 
advocates that were really pushing for what ended up being the final product. And I think 
that collective influence was very effective. It could have easily been the case that the 
WAPO bill, as introduced, where I think it was talking about a 35-year minimum, where I 
don’t think it was separated out by age, could have been in place. And so having the 
CLS’s, the WDA’s, the ACLU’s of the world working, and the individuals–we can’t 
forget them – who were either subject to long sentences for offenses they committed 
while they were under 18 or shortly thereafter–I think contributed strongly to the 
effectiveness of 5064. 
Culpability 
Some of the individuals interviewed discussed the issue of culpability among young 
offenders as a factor in forming the new law. Whether their immaturity warranted a more lenient 
treatment than adults was at question. P1 believed youth are less deserving of punishment than 
adults. Furthermore, individuals in this society are either more or less likely to be punished based 
on cultural biases: 
And the question that really made people stop and think is are you the same person you 





this? . . . Other than the fact that I raised a kid. I saw her. I saw her friends. I was a kid. I 
don’t think I’d go as far as the president when he visited a prison said but there’s a lot of 
part of the reason I got caught up in the prison system is a I never got caught. I think a lot 
of us are like that. Some of that comes from white privilege. Some of that was just dumb 
luck. I cannot accurately describe that. There are very few people who had been given a 
bad twist of fate would not have been caught up, especially the juvenile justice system. 
 
P2 noted that there are opposing views on when an individual should be considered 
culpable: 
And then you end up with the debate of the science here, and then philosophy and debate 
over at what point do we start holding people accountable for their actions in a 
punishment way? Where does that line exist? And prosecutors are wrestling with that. 
There’s a good cohort of mine that would say, “it’s 21 to do everything else, you know. 
You’re getting all the privileges of 21, then they’ve got to accept the accountability.” And 
they’re just fine with the system as it is. And there’s a few others that recognize that there 
are differences. 
 
P6 expressed disagreement that older adolescents should still qualify to serve a life 
sentence: 
So, that was one of the things I know we were concerned about is that is still allowed for 
life without parole for those who were 16 or 17 at the time of their offense. We testified 
to that, to all of our concerns. I think there might have been some concerns being set at 25 
years. So that was another one. 
P6 also noted the subsequent court cases that further addressed issues of adolescent 
culpability: 
The Houston-Sconiers decision, The Odell decision, The Bassett decision, all have been 
positive steps forward for having kids are different than adults for the purposes of 
sentencing. They’re not as culpable for their actions, even though those offenses may be 
similar, you cannot punish a kid in the same way you would as an adult. 
Related Literature 
Scott et al. (2006) focused on views on whether juveniles are culpable. Their findings 
reflected that participants generally viewed adolescents as “influenced by their developmental 
immaturity” and deserving of punishment and sentencing with that in mind, “even those who 





through a juvenile court system and separated from adults. These findings contradicted the 
reasoning inherent in criminal justice policy trends of the time. Participants in this research 
tended to consider the culpability of young offenders while creating the new sentencing 
legislation. 
Science 
The emergence of brain development research highlighted a different maturity trajectory 
than had been taken for granted in the criminal justice system at that point. The results of these 
scientific studies implied the brain was fully developed much later than was believed. The 
interviewed participants here often cited this new understanding and considered it while 
formulating the new law. 
P1 reflected on their understanding of American and European criminal justice systems 
with scientific research in mind:  
From what I’ve read, yes, they’re much more science based in doing what they do. They 
have lower recidivism rates. They have a lot different prison conditions than we have. We 
have more different than most Western European countries. And you don’t get radically 
different results after 15 or 20 years. I mean somebody you’ve helped 20 years versus 
somebody you’ve helped 30 years, I don’t know that there is a radically different result 
when you let them out of the prison door. 
P3 commented on the significant impact brain science on sentencing outcomes for older 
detainees: 
The issues regarding brain development are pretty much front and center in pretty much 
every discussion in juvenile justice and last session, you may know, there was an 
extension of the authority of juvenile rehabilitation authority to the age of 25 for young 
people who are committed as adults before the age of 18 and I think after that age of 18 
now. I’m not sure. So, that’s where it’s going. And I have some concerns, uh, the brain 
science is clear it says definitively, in a general population, there are going to be young 
people whose brains do not fully develop until the age of 26, or thereabouts, the question 
is whether that means we should extend juvenile jurisdiction all the way to 26 or whether 
we should keep the current demarcation of 18 and that has been I think, particularly with 
the passage of the bill that passed last year extending jurisdiction to 25, that’s been kind 





P6 reflected on the damage done in the past to individuals who were sentenced before 
brain science was available and considered, particularly to the marginalized: 
And going back even further, when you are talking about “tough on crime” when you’re 
talking about myths associated with Superpredators, when you are talking about the 
disproportionate impact that those policies have had on kids and community of color—to 
start rolling back on some of that stuff and to begin policies that are based on evidence 
rather than based on, often times, on myths, that are grounded in racism and classism, is, 
I think is helpful for our state and for the kids that are subject to this stuff. 
Related Literature  
The participants in this study often brought up the importance of evidence from 
developmental brain science. Steinberg (2012) stated its relevance in the formulation of public 
policy specifically:  
There is now incontrovertible evidence that adolescence is a period of significant changes 
in brain structure and function . . .  And the most important conclusion to emerge from 
recent research is that important changes in the brain anatomy and activity take place far 
longer into development than had previously been thought. Reasonable people may 
disagree about what these findings may mean as a society decides how to treat young 
people, but there is little room for disagreement about the fact that adolescence is a period 
of substantial brain maturation with respect to both structure and function. (p. 67) 
This research elucidated an understanding in the field of psychology that some of the 
current systems being used to process adjudicated juveniles were not serving society’s 









The individuals interviewed in this study commonly remarked on the significance of 
giving up some of what they wanted in return for achieving partial agreement with those who 
opposed their positions. P1 observed that those who held opposing opinions to theirs were 
willing to acquiesce over whether the bill should cover those who had been sentenced before the 
new law went into effect: 
It was clear that courts across the country come down on different sides of that question. 
Some said yes it was retro, some said no. I think the prosecutors here felt they might have 
been in a weak position. I don’t know if you’re talking to people on the prosecution side, 
but they were the ones who brought to the table to make it retroactive, to make it, I 
believe, 27 at the time, who had been sentenced with life without. It was something they 
were willing to give in exchange for keeping the possibility of keeping life without, okay. 
It was a chip. 
P1 also noted what they needed to give up in order to reach consensus with the other side 
and what they received in return: 
They were tenaciously hanging on to the idea that life without could be a discretionary 
sentence based on the individualized determination which was the phrasing used in 
Miller. That each kid needs to have an individualized determination. But they wanted that 
option to still be there for the judge. And in return, because their bill had been pretty 
much stymied the year before by a group of us, they came back with a better position that 
answered some of our concerns. Would I have liked to see life without go away in its 
entirety? Yes. But for agreeing to allow to that to continue as a discretionary sentence, not 
only did we get retroactive review, we got review of everybody at 25 with aggravated 
first but any kid who was sentenced to anything other than aggravated first that goes 
beyond 20 years, they get review at 20 years, with the presumption they will be released, 
so the state has the burden of proof that they not be released. 
 
P2 iterated the sacrifice and receiving inherent in all bill formation protocol: 
The thing about legislation is that it is an ongoing process and it is very kind of organic. 
It’s kind of changing as you go through. It was intended to be a process. It gets vetted 
through all these interests and viewpoints and usually what ends up passes is something 
very different from what started. And maybe that’s why they keep referring to it as 
though it’s like making sausage because it never comes out exactly the way it goes in. 
 
 





Anyway, there were these negotiating points on the table. Most of that happens in the 
background. And I’m actually not personally involved in that. So, I’m kind of behind the 
scenes. [name deleted here] is communicating with me about do you think the 
membership can live with this and that? Ya know, he’s checking in but he's kind of the 
one who’s doing that negotiation. 
 
P4 asserted what they believed motivates politicians to compromise in order to make 
change: 
You have to look at it . . . it’s incremental politics. It’s incremental change. You can make 
big change when you receive urgency from the public when they say “we’ve had 
enough.” Like women’s suffrage, they said “we need the right to vote.” Similar with the 
Civil rights act, same as the clean water act—these are all people marching for it and 
strikes and revolt. So the people who are responsible for making the change will 
compromise more than they ever would before. They do not want to see things get worse. 
In this case the prosecutors came with what they wanted and they got that out of the 
Senate, and then when it got to the House, the House started changing it. And they said 
“that’s as good as it’s going to get and we’ll come back for it and fight for something 
different another day.” 
Individual Rights 
 Some of the participants in this study reflected on how influential civil rights were in the 
creation of the new law. This amounted in a sentencing schematic that favored compassion 
toward juvenile offenders. P4 observed the recognition of individual rights in this legislation may 
not have been in line with what some of the legislators wanted: 
Now, there was a lot of leeway to help change the sentencing guidelines to be in line with 
the supreme court’s decision. And so, their original bill, I am guessing, was probably 
more lenient, as is the way the republicans might look at it, toward the offender, than they 
would have liked. 
P5 commented on how a focus on profit generation served to undermine the rights of 
juveniles in the prison system: 
Also, criminal justice is a money-making machine and when you are willing to add more 
bodies to the prison and pump up the numbers to get more money and funding for 
whatever cause they needed at that point, they just needed the money, right? So, we have 
2,000 more people coming to the prison and what they don’t tell you is that 1800 are 





P5 also observed how the juvenile sentencing process stripped people they knew of 
freedoms that negatively affected opportunities that they deserved: 
There’s a guy named [name deleted] who got 777 years as a juvenile. Because of that bill, 
he’s now free, he has a home in Washington and is doing very well. For that to even 
happen is crazy. There are people who are inside prisons now who probably shouldn’t be 
there that are convicted as juveniles but they don’t have the smarts or the support system 
to help with their cause to get them to their freedom. It takes that guy—every day his life 
was consumed with helping others. 
 
P6 remarked on the unique rights given to individuals protected under this new law: 
That wave of oh, where’s the appropriate compromise here, but at the other end you have 
the presumption of release, which isn’t available in other parole contexts in Washington 
State. So, the person shall be released unless the ISRB finds that they are more likely than 
not to commit a new offense if released. And also the de facto, or the virtual life, 
provision of being in there as well was like wow, this is something that generally would 
not be on the table. So anyone who’s serving 20 years or more having the opportunity to 
be released after 20 years, provides that benefit. 
Related Literature   
It has been strongly noted a divide exists between the interests of safety of the 
community and the rights of individuals throughout the literature review and interviews. There 
are those who emphasize the disparity between marginalized populations and the more privileged 
in sentencing practices. It is so extreme as to constitute its own form of public safety concern, 
when all citizens are concerned. Bryan Stevenson (Sharma, 2014) articulated how his work 
addressed this: 
We have, for twenty-five years, represented people on death row, people who have been 
unfairly sentenced, harshly sentenced, people who have been wrongly convicted. And 
what’s always been in the backdrop of these cases is racial inequality, because an 
extremely high percentage of the clients we represent are people of color. And then 
poverty—all of the clients who are not people of color are poor, and marginalized by 
poverty . . . I give these talks, and I tell people our systems treat you better if you are rich 





Interestingly, the data from this research indicates that some of those whose role it is to 
protect safety in Washington state. also acknowledge the importance of serving individuals’ 
needs. 
Public Safety 
 The idea of the importance of public safety was considered throughout the duration of the 
bill’s creation. The theme behind most of the statements pertained to fear which some believed 
was more important to address than individual rights. P1 discussed the guard rails put in place by 
the new law for ensuring those released had proven they were safe enough to  
re-enter society: 
The way the system is set up is every kid gets review at 20 years. So, they would be a 
minimum of 37 years old. That would be the maximum. They would be presumed to be 
released unless the state would present evidence that they would continue to be a danger. 
There have been a couple of hearings now in front of the indeterminate sentencing review 
board. Two or three have been released. At least here has been one I saw was not released 
and that person will be released sometime in the next five years. They could set up the 
next review as late as five years from the point of rejection. 
P1 described a scenario in which a politician was motivated to pay attention to the 
concerns of the community they served and the fire arms penalties that would grant beyond life 
sentences for adolescent offenders: 
Now, there are what become effective life sentences, which is why this 20 year review, 
and a couple of Halloweens ago there was a case out of Tacoma and it was three kids 
went around robbing trick or treaters, one of them had a gun and by the time you counted 
out the gun enhancement for each of the individuals who was robbed, it was three or four 
separate robberies, you literally ended up with one of these kids who was 16 at the time 
with a sentence of 80 years because that enhancement stacked and this was a major 
motivator for Jeannie Darneil, because it was in her district and were people frightened? 
Yeah. 
P2 remarked on the law’s allowance of keeping detainees incarcerated if prosecutors 
could prove they would likely be a danger to society if released: 
And in a bill like this, my memory is it went through some versions on issues like what’s 





release time, like 20 years, 25 years. And so I remember there was a discussion about 
what that time period should be before somebody becomes eligible for release and then I 
recall there was a discussion about whether there is a presumption that they get released 
or no presumption at all, just a hearing or in our world we call it “who has the burden of 
proof?” and that was a point where prosecutors ended up conceding that it would be okay 
with a presumptive release unless there’s a showing that there is a specific danger 
concern. 
Vulnerability 
 Several participants reported believing juveniles in the judicial system were a particularly 
vulnerable population and expressed the importance of being considered as separate than adults. 
P5 commented on their own personal experience as a juvenile detainee who would be considered 
appropriate for treatment as an adult in prison and the perceived lack of maturity needed to 
advocate for themselves as a 15-year-old: 
And I remember going into this lady’s office, her name is ______ , and to be honest, I’m 
kind of torn on how this went down. I went into her office and she said “I don’t know 
what to do with you. So, you can either go back to the hole or you can try to live out here 
in population. Because you have such a long sentence.” And, to be honest, I don’t know 
what I’m signing up for at the time. In population, what is that? I don’t really know. Or I 
can go back to segregation and I don’t want that because I know what that is and anything 
has to be better than that. So I was like “okay.” But to make that be the choice for a kid—
where you have to go into a very violent prison or you have to go into this mind-bending 
game of solitary confinement dark place. What would you like to do? You just gave me 
that as a choice? That’s rough. But, at 15 you don’t know what you are agreeing to at that 
moment so I chose population. 
P6 highlighted the progress that has been made in juvenile law since this law was put into 
effect, which recognizes the special status juveniles have due to their developmental abilities: 
It’s interesting. There’s been a lot of stuff that’s happened since the Miller fix in 
Washington, and some of them I’ve alluded to. Both in the courts and the legislature. The 
6160 around auto decline has been a big step in the right direction. Four offenses were 
taken off the auto decline offense list. And those there aren’t even subject to discretionary 
decline now. Those kids now are exclusively subject to the juvenile court system. And 
anybody that was similarly situated prior to this bill could be facing a long sentence in the 
adult system in all of those consequences . . . The passage of the Yer Act  in 2015, which 
increased opportunities of juveniles sealing of records, which eliminated most juvenile 






Washington State Senate Bill 6160, which passed in 2018, further refined policy related 
to juvenile status within the criminal justice system. In keeping with laws that incorporated a 
growing body of brain development research, judges were mandated to consider age and 
mitigating circumstances when delivering sentences. Additionally, the list for which a juvenile 
would be considered automatically declined to the adult system was curtailed significantly. 
Convicted young offenders who were once considered under the authority of the juvenile system 
and were, as such, released upon their 21st birthdays were now held until their 25th. Bill 6160 
also required the WSIPP to conduct research and deliver a report monitoring the law’s effects on 
both public safety and individual rights (2018). King County Prosecutor, Dan Satterberg, echoed 
the emerging consensus of both of these positions when he stated, “Sending a young person to 
adult prison is a very serious decision that can have lifelong implications . . . In twenty years 
we’ve learned a lot about the science of cognitive development and now it’s informing our case 
laws and our practice” (Green, 2018). 
Rehabilitation 
 The tendency to view juveniles as having the potential to learn to change their behavior 
for the better was widely accepted by the participants in this study. Implications stemming from 
this understanding helped bolster the idea that they could release into the community and 
contribute pro-socially. P2 remarked that juvenile offenders are increasingly more likely to be 
placed in rehabilitative programs than in detention: 
So, that was about two decades ago, so it tells you that at that point, we were still sort of 
in that heavy punishment, detention focus, so two weeks ago, we had no kids in 
detention. And our average population probably runs ten. Two of the dorms are closed. 
They’re only using one dorm now and have only been using one over the last several 
years. So, the incarceration/detention is being used less and less and less in juvenile and 
is becoming much more focused on programming and on re-entry and all of that. And I’m 





committed serious crimes there, but the population overall is diminishing because we are 
using incarceration less and less. 
P3 saw the rehabilitative model not only transforming the juvenile system, but the adult 
system as well over time:  
It’s interesting in the adult system that I spend most of my time now the push to going 
more toward, I wouldn’t say a rehabilitative model, but a re-entry model, recognizing that 
even if you are over the age of 18 when you are convicted of crimes, you’re still going to 
go back to the community so we better make some investments to give you the tools to 
re-integrate into the community so you don’t go back into prison, which is essentially 
what we do with juveniles just more explicit—it’s a rehabilitative model rather than a 
punitive model and that’s where I think it’s going to extend into the adult system more 
and more in Washington. 
Related Literature  
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy is a nonpartisan agency charged with 
examining the effects legislation has on the public after its enactment. Regarding juvenile justice, 
WSIPP (2020) noted that adolescent offenders who served their sentences in adult prison 
facilities were more likely to recidivate than those who did were juvenile detention centers. 
Several programs offered to juveniles there have also proven to yield lower recidivism rates: 
Education and Employment Training (Miller et al., 2015); Family Integrated Transitions (for 
felons; Aos, 2004); and Functional Family Therapy (Barnoski, 2004). 
Collaboration 
 Participants attributed the success of the bill’s passage to working with individuals and 
organizations with different points of view. They saw importance in productive engagement with 
each other, despite their positions on the relevant issues. P2 emphasized the value of making a 
point to side with opponents sometimes: 
But our effectiveness is couched in our ability to collaborate. Internally we’ve had quite a 
bit of discussion recently within WAPO about making sure we are as clear about what we 
are for as we are against. Because from a political standpoint, if you start walking into the 
legislature, walking into meetings being held to work out bills and things and all you’re 





because pretty soon you are looking people in the eye and saying no all the time. So, 
strategically, we’ve had that conversation within the Prosecutor Association that we need 
to make sure that if we are going to go in and saying no to some things, we are also 
willing to say what we will say yes to. Not just what we are for but what we are against. 
Personally, that is what I feel is how we remain effective in the legislature. 
P6 paid homage to the work of individuals and organizations who worked together to 
bring about an important policy change: 
There were a lot of stages and for advocates, a lot of different advocates with concerns as 
this moves along. Some hope as well that this would be able to impact a number of those 
who were convicted as youth who, under any other circumstances, wouldn’t have those 
opportunities . . .  I don’t know if it’s possible to evaluate the effectiveness of my sole 
influence on the bill or -----------‘s influence on the bill just because there were a 
coalition of juvenile justice advocates that were really pushing for what ended up being 
the final product. And I think that collective influence was very effective. It could have 
easily been the case that the WAPO bill, as introduced, where I think it was talking about 
a 35 year minimum, where I don’t think it was separated out by age, could have been in 
place. And so having the CLS’s, the WDA’s, the ACLU’s of the world working, and the 
individuals—we can’t forget them—who were either subject to long sentences for 
offenses they committed while they were under 18 or shortly thereafter—I think 
contributed strongly to the effectiveness of 5064. 
Summary 
When the American colonies were first established through the first half of the 20th 
century, children were generally regarded as incapable of intent to commit crimes. Their 
behavior was seen as a manifestation of the way they were nurtured. As such, the juvenile 
criminal justice system focused its aim toward rehabilitating children, who were seen to have 
malleable brains. The state was considered ultimately responsible for the well-being of children, 
who deserved parental protection. 
From the 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century, the tide turned in juvenile justice. 
The once taken for granted parental role government played became increasingly punitive and 
processed young offenders more similarly as adults. Adolescents were given less opportunities to 
be detained separately and offered rehabilitative programming and, in fact, subject to the harshest 





In 2012, the Miller vs. Alabama federal ruling reflected a shift back to earlier thinking 
about juvenile defendants. Bolstered by development brain science, the mandate vastly restricted 
life without parole sentencing and required that young offenders be afforded the chance to have 
mitigating factors presented in criminal proceedings. Additionally, the current brain science 
paved the way toward reintroducing the practice of rehabilitation for convicted adolescents, as 
well as separating them from adults in prison. Here we see the federal government taking on a 
more parental role that protects the young by investing in sentencing and programming that 
serves more to teach than to punish. These concepts were revealed in all interviews conducted in 
this research. 
Once participants were interviewed, and their interviews transcribed, data analysis was 
conducted. According to Giorgi’s (2012) descriptive phenomenological psychological method, 
the researcher stated her potential bias in considering the data (“bracketing”). The transcribed 
material was then marked as having different “meaning units.” These units are considered as 
having been chosen with the investigator’s bias and would offer different information than what 
another would choose at this point.  The meaning units were scrutinized and noted when “direct 
and psychologically more sensitive expressions” were determined, at which point “essential 
structures” were gleaned (Giorgi, 2012, pp. 5–6). The labels given then represented a process in 
which description of selected parts of raw data were drawn “precisely as it appears and nothing is 
to be added or subtracted from it” (Giorgi, 2012, p. 6). This is a distinctive process from that of 
interpretation, which requires the researcher to “add” meaning behind what the descriptive 
researcher notes at face value. In this study, eight essential meanings were revealed once data 





and negotiation, (e) individual rights, (f) public safety, (g) vulnerability, (h) rehabilitation, and (i) 
collaboration.  
Limitations 
There were several limitations to this research worth noting. First, it cannot necessarily 
be generalized. Themes emerging from a different state hearing list of testifying participants 
could highlight other perceptions. Whether they would be more or less reflective ideas covered in 
my literature review is unknown.  
Additionally, one of the participants (P1) was interviewed when this project was in a pilot 
state, which was in 2015. The others were interviewed over the course of 2018 and 2020. P1 was, 
therefore, relying more on independent recollection than the others who relied on the transcript 
of the testimony in order to participate. This potential discrepancy in memory may skew the data 
in the sense that P1 may present as having been more strongly impacted by the experience 
because they could remember it more readily than the others. 
Future Research Implications 
Since this research was centered around a legislative bill that was passed in 2014, it is 
important to investigate how the trajectory of sentencing guidelines has changed since that time. 
The assumption here is that increased knowledge and acceptance of brain development science 
would continue to favor adolescents in the criminal justice system by providing more social 
services and less detention time. However, in this recent political environment in which science 
has been devalued by the heads of the federal government as a contribution to forming policy, it 
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1) What was your reason or motivation for getting involved in in this specific legislation 
pertaining to juveniles in the judicial system?  
2) How are you personally and professionally involved in juvenile justice?  
3) Had you ever testified in hearings before? 
 a) If yes, which ones? 
4) Have you testified in hearings since this one? 
 a) If yes, which ones? 
5) In this case, did you prepare for the testimony yourself or did someone else do it for 
you? 
6) What has your experience been throughout the various stages of Washington State 
Senate Bill 5064’s passage?  
7) How do you feel about the effectiveness of your influence on Senate Bill 5064?  
8) What are your thoughts on the future of juveniles in the judicial system?  









































Project: Influencing Legislation for Juveniles in the Adult Judicial System: A Phenomenological 
Examination of Legal Advocates 
Researcher: Krista Franklin, Psy.D. Student in Clinical Psychology 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this research study is to 
highlight the shared experiences of those who testified on behalf of legislation affecting juvenile 
defendants. This research project is a degree requirement. 
 
You are being asked to participate because of your involvement in juvenile advocacy during the 
development of important legislation. On February 12, 2014, Senate Bill 5064, entitled “An Act 
Relating to Persons Sentenced for Offenses Committed Prior to Reaching Eighteen Years of 
Age” passed in Washington State. Your name was listed in the bill’s testimony as having testified 
during the argument for the bill. 
 
If you participate in this research, you will be asked to describe your experiences advocating for 
juveniles. In addition to being asked to describe your experiences, you will be given a form to 
complete that requests demographic information.  
 
The risk inherent in this study is it may be difficult to discuss emotions tied to the experience of 
having advocated for juveniles. Questions will be sent to interviewees in advance of the 
interview. The primary reason for sending the questions out ahead of time is to spare participants 
the experience of being surprised by what is being asked as well as to give them each a chance to 
mentally and emotionally process their feelings before discussing the experience. 
 
This research will add to both fields of psychology and law by illuminating the history of 
juvenile legal regulations and the shared experience of those who advocated within that process. 
The addition of this study will enhance the field’s understanding of the experience of those who 
were involved in the development of important policy change, which has affected a vulnerable 
population. 
 
Your participation will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour. There will be no compensation 
for this study. 
 
Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. You may refuse to participate at all, or 
choose to stop your participation at any point in the research, without fear of penalty or negative 
consequences of any kind. 
 
The information/data you provide for this research will be treated confidentially, and all raw data 
will be kept in a secured file by the principal investigator. Results of the research will be reported 
as aggregate summary data only, and no individually identifiable information will be presented.  
 











There will be no direct or immediate personal benefits from your participation in this research.  
 
The results of the research may contribute to society as a whole. Your participation will serve to 
educate the public about the unique and complex issues facing juveniles in the criminal justice 
system. Furthermore, your contribution may inspire others to act on behalf of young offenders 
for appropriate sentencing schemes and treatment.  
 
Please note that this research study has been reviewed and Certified by the Institutional Review 
Board, Antioch University, Seattle. For research-related problems or questions regarding 
participants' rights, contact Antioch University’s Institutional Board Chair, Mark Russell, PhD at 
xxxxxx@antioch.edu 
 
The primary researcher conducting this study is Krista Franklin, who is a doctoral student in 
psychology. Dr. Dana Waters is the supervisor of the research. She can be reached at 
xxxxxx@antioch.edu. If you have questions later, you may contact Krista Franklin at 
xxxxxx@antioch.edu or (206) XXX-XXXX.  
 
I have read and understand the information explaining the purpose of this research and my rights 
and responsibilities as a participant. My signature below designates my consent to participate in 
this research study, according to the terms and conditions outlined above. 
 
 
Participant Name (printed): _________________________________________________ 
 
Participant Signature:_______________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
Participant Phone Number:__________________________________________________ 
 
Is it OK to leave you a voicemail message on this phone?       Yes ☐          No ☐ 
 
In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview audio-recorded.  
 
Participant Signature:_______________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
Printed name of person obtaining consent ______________________________________ 
 



































Collected demographic Information for Participants 










Years of Experience in Field:____________     
 
Age: ___________________  
 
Gender: Male  /  Female  
   
Years of Education:___________________ 
 










Years in Washington:__________________ 
 
Children?: Yes  /  No     
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